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NOTE

COYOTE PUBLISHING, INC. v.
MILLER: BLURRING THE
STANDARDS OF COMMERCIAL
AND NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH

NICOLE E. WOLFE *
It is not easy to describe the present position of legal opinion on
advertising and free speech. Only a poet can capture the essence of
chaos. 1

INTRODUCTION
Prostitution is regarded as one of the world’s oldest professions. 2
While the sale of sexual services has been in existence for centuries,
practically every state in the United States has enacted laws that fully
prohibit it. 3 The underlying purposes for creating such laws include

*
J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco,
California; B.A. Political Science and Law, Societies and Justice, University of Washington, Seattle,
Washington. I would like to thank the members of the Golden Gate University Law Review
Editorial Board, without whose incredible guidance and expertise this Note would not have been
published. Also, an immeasurable thanks to my friends and Matt for their patience and support
throughout this publication process. I especially would like to thank my mother, Kathy; stepfather,
Ian; and brother, Ryan for their never-ending love and encouragement as I pursue my legal career.
This Note is dedicated to my father, Jim.
1
R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32 (1977).
2
See, e.g., People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (N.Y. 1978).
3
Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 596 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
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preventing communicable diseases, averting sexual exploitation of
women and children, and reducing criminal misconduct associated with
prostitution. 4 Standing alone, the State of Nevada has adopted a nuanced
approach to the legalized sale of sexual services. 5 The motivation
behind legalizing the commodification of sex is that it will reduce the
negative health and safety impacts of unregulated and illegal
prostitution. 6 By legalizing prostitution in designated counties, however,
Nevada prostitution laws have attracted constitutional controversy, more
specifically the tension between First Amendment free speech rights and
restrictions on commercial advertising. 7 These constitutional issues
recently came to the forefront in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.
In Coyote Publishing, Inc. v. Miller, the Ninth Circuit considered
the constitutionality of a Nevada statute that regulates commercial
advertising of legal brothels. 8 The Ninth Circuit held that severe
restrictions on brothel advertising, even in counties where brothels are
legal, are valid under the First Amendment. 9 The court concluded that
Nevada Revised Statutes sections 201.430(1) and 201.440, which largely
prohibit the advertising of licensed brothels, met the four prongs of the
Central Hudson test. 10 Although the Ninth Circuit held that Nevada
Revised Statutes section 201.430(1) was constitutional, the facts of the
case did not apply to Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) and
therefore the Ninth Circuit never addressed the constitutionality of this
portion of the statute. 11 Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2)
nevertheless facially restricts more than just purely commercial speech.
Consequently, section 201.430(2) is overbroad and should be subject to a

1556 (2011).
4
See generally Commonwealth v. DeStefanis, 658 A.2d 416 (Pa. 1995).
5
Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d at 605.
6
Id.
7
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting right to free speech), with Coyote Publ’g, 598
F.3d 592 (holding that restrictions on brothel advertising were valid restrictions on speech).
8
Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d 592.
9
Id. at 611.
10
Id. at 602-11. According to the Supreme Court in Central Hudson, in order for a
restriction on lawful commercial advertising to be valid there must be a substantial governmental
interest, the restriction must be narrowly drawn toward that interest, and the restriction must be no
more extensive than necessary to meet that interest. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
11
Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d 592. Whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision regarding the
constitutionality of Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(1) was correct is beyond the scope of
this Note. This Note solely addresses the constitutionality of Nevada Revised Statutes section
201.430(2), which the Ninth Circuit did not address because it did not apply to the facts of the case.
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strict scrutiny analysis, as opposed to the more moderate Central Hudson
test. 12
This Note discusses how Nevada Revised Statutes section
201.430(2) facially restricts more than just purely commercial speech
and would fail strict scrutiny analysis. 13 The Ninth Circuit in Coyote
Publishing, Inc. v. Miller did not address the constitutionality of this
section because the facts of the case pertained to advertising of licensed
brothels, which is regulated by section 201.430(1), as opposed to
advertising of unlicensed brothels, which is regulated by section
201.430(2). 14 Part I of this Note gives a brief history of prostitution,
outlines the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations pursuant
to the Central Hudson test and explains the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
Coyote Publishing for concluding that Nevada Revised Statutes section
201.430(1) applies solely to commercial speech. Part II argues that
although the Ninth Circuit held that Nevada Revised Statutes section
201.430(1) applies solely to commercial speech, section 201.430(2)
should be invalidated by the doctrine of overbreadth because it regulates
commercial as well as noncommercial speech. Finally, Part III proposes
that a strict scrutiny analysis is the appropriate level of scrutiny to
analyze Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2). This Part also
argues that section 201.430(2) would fail a strict scrutiny analysis
because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROSTITUTION

Prostitution, defined as the act of engaging in sexual activity for
money or an equivalent, is frequently regarded as “an evil over which the
legislature has almost plenary power.” 15 Throughout the history of the
United States, many state and municipal laws were passed in an attempt
to curb the business of prostitution. 16 In 1692, Massachusetts passed the
12

Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 557.
The analysis of Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.440 is beyond the scope of this Note.
The court in Coyote Publishing found section 201.440, which prohibits the advertising of brothels in
counties where prostitution is illegal, to be constitutionally valid. Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d at 611.
This Note solely addresses constitutional issues regarding section 201.430(2).
14
Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d 592.
15
State v. Green, 131 P.2d 411, 412 (Ariz. 1942); see also State v. Pascal, 950 A.2d 566, 576
(Conn. App. Ct. 2008); State v. B Bar Enters., Inc., 649 P.2d 978 (Ariz. 1982).
16
Jessica N. Drexler, Governments’ Role in Turning Tricks: The World’s Oldest Profession
in the Netherlands and the United States, 15 DICK. J. INT’L L. 201, 204 (1996) (citing ROBERT T.
13
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first laws that regulated sexual intercourse. 17 During the 1800s, more
laws targeting sexual services were enacted, yet prostitution was still
tolerated. 18
In the early 1900s, criminal sanctions prohibiting
prostitution were executed at the state level throughout much of the
United States. 19 By 1971, every state, with the exception of Nevada,
criminalized prostitution. 20
Today, the overwhelming majority of states heavily regulate
prostitution in an effort to prevent communicable diseases, inhibit sexual
exploitation, and reduce criminal misconduct associated with the sale of
sexual services. 21 Statutes that regulate and punish the act of prostitution
and related offenses fall within the police power of the states. 22 The
purpose of these statutes is to protect public health and welfare and to
prevent criminal activity associated with prostitution. 23 However, these
criminal statutes have not ended the centuries-old practice. 24
Recognizing this reality, Nevada is currently the only state that permits
the sale of sexual services in certain counties. 25
Prostitution houses are legal, yet heavily monitored, in eleven of the
sixteen Nevada counties. 26 Nevada counties with more than 400,000
residents are prohibited from issuing licenses to brothels. 27 This includes
Clark County, where the city of Las Vegas is located. 28 Even in counties
where brothels are legal, the sale of sexual services is still prohibited
unless it is held in a licensed, designated brothel. 29 Among the several
FRANCOEUR, TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON ISSUES IN HUMAN SEXUALITY 264 (Robert T.
Francoeur ed., 1987)).
17
Id. (citing ROBERT T. FRANCOEUR, TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON ISSUES IN
HUMAN SEXUALITY 264 (Robert T. Francoeur ed., 1987)).
18
Id. (citing ROBERT T. FRANCOEUR, TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON ISSUES IN
HUMAN SEXUALITY 264 (Robert T. Francoeur ed., 1987)).
19
Id. at 204-05 (citing ROBERT T. FRANCOEUR, TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON ISSUES
IN HUMAN SEXUALITY 264 (Robert T. Francoeur ed., 1987)).
20
Id. (citing ROBERT T. FRANCOEUR, TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON ISSUES IN
HUMAN SEXUALITY 264 (Robert T. Francoeur ed., 1987)).
21
Id. at 205-06.
22
Moody v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 697 P.2d 1310, 1318 (Kan. 1985).
23
State v. Schultz, 582 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
24
Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 595 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1556 (2011).
25
Id. at 596.
26
Id.
27
Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Heller, No. CV-06-329-JCM-PAL, 2007 WL 2254702, at *1 (D.
Nev. Aug. 3, 2007), rev’d sub nom. Coyote Publ’g v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir, 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011).
28
Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 596 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1556 (2011).
29
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.354(1) (Westlaw 2011).
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restrictions 30 on legal brothels are severe limits on the advertising of
brothels, both where prostitution is illegal and where it is legal. 31 These
restrictions that inhibit advertising are subject to First Amendment
protections. 32
B.

FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH

One of the core principles of the First Amendment is to protect the
rights of individuals to give and obtain truthful information about lawful
activities. 33 From this principle, the First Amendment prevents the
government from suppressing speech because of its mere disapproval of
the message. 34 To safeguard the free flow of commercial speech, the
United States Supreme Court articulated a four-part test to determine the
constitutionality of restrictions that inhibit purely commercial speech. 35
Courts review laws that restrict commercial speech under a specific level
of intermediate scrutiny referred to as the Central Hudson test. 36
1.

Defining Commercial Speech

For First Amendment purposes, commercial speech is defined as an
expression related to the economic interests of the speaker, generally in
the form of commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services. 37
Speech is considered commercial if (1) the speech is admittedly
advertising, (2) the speech references a specific product, and (3) the
speaker has an economic motive for the speech. 38 Alternatively, speech
30

Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d at 596. The restrictions on legal brothels include imposing
liability on owners of brothels if they knew or should have known that a prostitute has tested positive
for HIV. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.1397 (Westlaw 2011). Nevada has also created
statutory protections in an effort to prevent coercion of the employees by the operators of the
brothels. For example, section 201.300 makes criminal the act of “pandering,” which includes
inducing, persuading, encouraging, or enticing a person to engage in the sale of sexual services.
Additionally, it is a crime for a person to live from the earnings of a sex worker or receive money
from the proceeds of any prostitute without consideration. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.320
(Westlaw 2011).
31
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.440 (Westlaw 2011).
32
Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
33
Brief of Amicus Curiae DKT Liberty Project in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee Coyote
Publishing, Inc., Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d 592 (No. 07-16633), 2008 WL 1756433 at *2.
34
Id.
35
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
36
See id.
37
United States v. Bell, 238 F. Supp. 2d 696, 703 (M.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d, 414 F.3d 474 (3d
Cir. 2005).
38
Am. Acad. of Pain Mgmt. v. Joseph, 353 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983)); see also Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v.
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is not commercial if it does not promote the speaker’s product for sale or
encourage a commercial transaction with the user. 39
In order to be classified as commercial, speech must do “no more
than” propose a commercial transaction. 40 In other words, commercial
speech is an expression that relates solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience. 41 The Ninth Circuit has accepted the Supreme
Court’s “no more than” criterion when defining commercial speech. 42
The Ninth Circuit identified this criterion as follows: “If speech is not
‘purely commercial’—that is, if it does more than propose a commercial
transaction—then it is entitled to full First Amendment protection.”43
2.

The Central Hudson Test

The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Central Hudson governs
restrictions on commercial speech. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission, a New York electrical utility
company challenged the constitutionality of a regulation, promulgated by
the Public Service Commission, that prohibited all advertising that
promoted the use of electricity. 44 The Supreme Court, in finding that the
ordinance restricted purely commercial speech, formulated a four-step
test for analyzing the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial
speech. 45 The Court explained that in order for a restriction on
commercial advertising to be valid, (1) the speech must concern a legal
activity and must not be misleading, (2) there must be a substantial
governmental interest to be achieved by the restriction, (3) the restriction
must be narrowly drawn to advance that interest, and (4) the restriction
must be no more extensive than necessary to meet that interest.46
Applying this test, the Court found that conserving energy was a
substantial interest but the Commission’s restriction was more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest; thus, the regulation was

Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1994).
39
New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
40
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976).
41
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
42
See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001); S.O.C.,
Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 1998).
43
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Hoffman, 255
F.3d at 1184).
44
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558-59.
45
Id. at 566.
46
Id. at 564.
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unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 47
Subsequently, courts analyze laws that regulate purely commercial
speech for constitutional defects pursuant to the Central Hudson test.
However, restrictions that inhibit more than purely commercial speech
are granted full constitutional protection and are subject to a strict
scrutiny analysis.
C.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF COYOTE PUBLISHING, INC. V.
MILLER

In March of 2006, Shady Lady Ranch, a licensed brothel, wished to
place an advertisement in both High Desert Advocate and Las Vegas
CityLife, two newspapers that were circulated in Nevada. 48 Coyote
Publishing, Inc., a Nevada corporation that owned High Desert Advocate
and Las Vegas CityLife, wanted to run the advertisement. 49 The
newspapers circulated in counties where brothels were legal, as well as
counties where brothels were prohibited. 50 Due to the provisions of
Nevada Revised Statutes sections 201.430(1) and 201.440, Las Vegas
CityLife rejected Shady Lady Ranch’s advertisement out of fear of
prosecution. 51
Section 201.440 prohibits brothel advertising in counties where the
sale of sexual services is illegal by local or state statute. 52 Moreover,
section 201.430 prohibits certain forms of advertising in counties where
brothels are permitted. 53 Specifically, section 201.430(1) restricts
individuals acting on behalf of brothels from advertising, section
201.430(2) restricts advertising of unlicensed brothels, and section
201.430(3) makes inclusion of locations of brothels in any publication
prima facie evidence of advertising for the purposes of this section. 54
Violation of these advertising statutes may result in criminal penalties,
including fines and imprisonment. 55

47

Id. at 572-73.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Heller, No. CV-06-329JCM-PAL, 2007 WL 2254702 (D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2007), rev’d sub nom. Coyote Publ’g v. Miller, 598
F.3d 592 (9th Cir, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. Additionally, Shady Lady Ranch wished to advertise in public theaters, streets, and
highways, in a manner that was prohibited by section 201.430(1). Id.
52
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.440 (Westlaw 2011).
53
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(1) (Westlaw 2011).
54
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(1)-(3) (Westlaw 2011).
55
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(4) (Westlaw 2011).
48
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Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430 in its relevant portion
states:
1. It is unlawful for . . . any owner, operator, agent or employee of a
house of prostitution, or anyone acting on behalf of any such person,
to advertise . . . any house of prostitution:
(a) In any public theater, on the public streets of any city or town,
or on any public highway; or
(b) In any county, city or town where prostitution is prohibited by
local ordinance or where the licensing of a house of prostitution
is prohibited by state statute.

2. It is unlawful for any person knowingly to prepare or print an
advertisement concerning a house of prostitution not licensed for that
purpose pursuant to NRS 244.345 . . . in any county, city or town
where prostitution is prohibited by local ordinance or where the
licensing of a house of prostitution is prohibited by state statute.
3. Inclusion in any display, handbill or publication of the address,
location or telephone number of a house of prostitution or of
identification of a means of transportation to such a house, or of
directions telling how to obtain any such information, constitutes
prima facie evidence of advertising for the purposes of this section.
4. Any person, company, association or corporation violating the
provisions of this section shall be punished . . . by imprisonment in the
56
county jail . . . or by a fine . . . or by both fine and imprisonment.

Coyote Publishing, Inc., and Shady Lady Ranch (collectively
“Coyote Publishing”) filed a complaint against the Nevada Secretary of
State, the Nevada Attorney General, and the Clark County District
Attorney. 57 Coyote Publishing challenged sections 201.430 and 201.440,
alleging that the restrictions violated the First Amendment. 58 In a motion
for summary judgment, Coyote Publishing argued that sections 201.430
and 201.440 restricted truthful, non-misleading commercial speech and
that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the statutes met the Central

56

Id.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Heller, No. CV-06-329JCM-PAL, 2007 WL 2254702 (D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2007), rev’d sub nom. Coyote Publ’g v. Miller, 598
F.3d 592 (9th Cir, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011).
58
Id.
57
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Hudson test. 59 The defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
and a cross-motion for summary judgment arguing that these statutes
satisfied the Central Hudson test and were thus constitutional. 60
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted
Coyote Publishing’s motion for summary judgment. 61 The district court
found that sections 201.430 and 201.440 restricted free speech and thus
were unconstitutional. 62 In reaching its decision, the district court stated
that the definition of “prima facie evidence” contained in section
201.430(3) reached far more than commercial speech and therefore
required a strict scrutiny analysis. 63 Accordingly, the district court found
that section 201.430(3) violated the U.S. Constitution because the
government had neither demonstrated a compelling interest nor shown
that the statute used the least restrictive means to achieve such an
interest. 64 The court then analyzed the remaining portion of section
201.430 using the four-part analysis set forth in Central Hudson. 65 The
district court concluded that section 201.430 failed to meet the Central
Hudson test and was thus unconstitutional. 66 Subsequently, in 2010, the
Nevada Secretary of State appealed the grant of summary judgment, and
the case went before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 67
D.

NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING AND REASONING

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and upheld
the constitutionality of the statutes, finding that both Nevada Revised
Statutes section 201.430(1) and 201.440 targeted purely commercial

59

Id.
Id.
61
Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Heller, No. CV-06-329-JCM-PAL, 2007 WL 2254702, at *7 (D.
Nev. Aug. 3, 2007) (order granting summary judgment), rev’d sub nom. Coyote Publ’g v. Miller,
598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011).
62
Id. at *3.
63
Id. at *2-3.
64
Id. at *3.
65
Id. at *3-7.
66
Id. at *7. The district court rejected the defendants’ argument that advertising of licensed
brothels in counties that do not allow them will increase illegal prostitution in those counties. The
court also found that defendant’s second argument, protecting the county option to ban prostitution,
was unfounded. The court relied on Bigelow v. Virginia, which stated that a state may not, “under
the guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another State from disseminating
information about an activity that is legal in that State.” Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824-25
(1975).
67
Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1556
(2011).
60
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speech. 68 As a result, the Ninth Circuit analyzed these statutes using the
Central Hudson test. 69 In reaching this conclusion, the court first stated
that section 201.430(1) does not burden any significant amount of fully
protected, noncommercial speech. 70 The court noted that because
section 201.430(1) states that only brothel owners or persons acting on
behalf of brothel owners are prohibited from advertising, publishers of
news accounts could not be punished under this portion of the statute. 71
Second, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that in Nevada, where laws contain
statutory language making certain facts “prima facie evidence” of guilt, a
judge could submit this presumption to the jury only if a “reasonable
juror on the evidence as a whole . . . could find guilt or the presumed fact
beyond a reasonable doubt.” 72 Thus, the prima facie provision would
have effect only if the evidence, viewed as a whole, would lead a
reasonable juror to find that the material was “advertising.” 73 The Ninth
Circuit presumed that a judge would not submit the prima facie
presumption to the jury in a case involving a newspaper article, because
a reasonable juror would not conclude that a newspaper article was
advertising. 74 Therefore, the court concluded that section 201.430(1)
would not apply to newspaper articles or postings on Internet message
boards by individuals acting independently of brothels. 75
Since the Ninth Circuit found that Nevada Revised Statutes sections
201.430(1) and 201.440 regulated purely commercial speech, the court
proceeded to analyze the restrictions using the Central Hudson test. 76
The Ninth Circuit first acknowledged that prostitution in some counties
in Nevada was a legal activity and the speech was not misleading. 77 It
then found that Nevada has a substantial state interest in support of
advertising restrictions. 78 According to the Ninth Circuit, the deeply
rooted notion that “[t]here are, in a civilized society, some things that

68

Id. at 599.
Id. at 602.
70
Id. at 599.
71
Id.
72
Id. (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 47.230(2)).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 599 n.9.
76
Id. at 599.
77
Id. at 606. It should be noted that prostitution is legal only in designated counties in
Nevada. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.345 (Westlaw 2011). In counties where prostitution is
not legal, the First Amendment extends no protection and the analysis ends. See Cent. Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980); Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d at
606.
78
Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d at 602-03.
69
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money cannot buy,” coupled with the prevention of exploitation of
women and children, justified Nevada’s advertising restrictions. 79 The
court also noted that advertising restrictions “directly and materially
advance” Nevada’s interest in limiting the commodification of sex
because they eliminate the public’s exposure and reduce the market
demand for it. 80 Finally, the court concluded that the restrictions on
advertising were no more extensive than necessary to meet Nevada’s
interest. 81 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that section 201.430(1) met the
Central Hudson test and therefore did not violate the First Amendment. 82
Although the Ninth Circuit reached a conclusion regarding the
constitutionality of section 201.430(1), it did not address the
constitutionality of section 201.430(2), which regulates advertising of
unlicensed brothels, because the facts of the case pertained to advertising
of licensed brothels. 83
II.

ARGUMENT

Since Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) applies to
unlicensed brothels, the Ninth Circuit did not address its constitutionality
and instead held that section 201.430(1), as applied to the facts in Coyote
Publishing pertaining to a licensed brothel, was constitutional. 84
Nevertheless, section 201.430(2) is overbroad because it restricts both
commercial and noncommercial speech. If High Desert Advocate and
Las Vegas CityLife, the two newspapers in Coyote Publishing,
independently published an article that referenced unlicensed brothels as
opposed to licensed brothels, section 201.430(1) would not apply.85
Instead, these newspapers would face sanctions pursuant to section
201.430(2) even though they were not acting on behalf of a brothel. 86
Since Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) restricts both
commercial and noncommercial speech, it is subject to a strict scrutiny
analysis because fully protected speech is inhibited by the construction of
the statute. 87 As a result, section 201.430(2) should be invalidated

79

Id. at 602-05.
Id. at 608.
81
Id. at 610.
82
Id. at 610-11.
83
See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011).
84
Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d at 602-03.
85
See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(1) (Westlaw 2011).
86
See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011).
87
See generally Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
496-97 (1982); United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1309 (D. Utah 2003).
80
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because the statute is not narrowly tailored and consequently cannot
withstand a strict scrutiny analysis.
A.

NEVADA REVISED STATUTES SECTION 201.430(2) SHOULD BE
DEEMED INVALID BECAUSE IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
OVERBROAD

Section 201.430(2) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it
restricts both noncommercial speech as well as commercial speech.
Restrictions that target unprotected speech are unconstitutionally
overbroad if they also control types of protected speech or press
activity. 88 Overbroad restrictions on speech that carry criminal sanctions
are “particularly repugnant” unless they are drawn with narrow
specificity. 89 The test is “whether the challenged provisions . . . burden
no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government
interest.” 90 Thus, statutes that criminalize a significant amount of
constitutionally protected speech may be deemed unconstitutionally
overbroad even if they carry some legitimate applications. 91
1.

The Overbreadth Doctrine Is Appropriate

The doctrine of overbreadth is usually inapplicable to statutes that
regulate purely commercial speech. 92 The rationale behind this is that
commercial expression is less likely to be deterred by overbroad
regulation and is “more hardy, less likely to be ‘chilled,’ and not in need
of surrogate litigators.” 93 The exception to this rule applies to
regulations of purely commercial speech that could potentially affect
noncommercial speech. 94

88

See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
State v. Hauge, 547 N.W.2d 173, 176 (S.D. 1996).
90
Id. (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994)).
91
State v. Kilburn, 84 P.3d 1215, 1221 (Wash. 2004).
92
See generally Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
496-97 (1982); United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1309 (D. Utah 2003).
93
Desnick v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 665 N.E.2d 1346, 1353 (Ill.1996) (quoting Bd. of
Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989)).
94
State by Spannaus v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 740-41 (Minn. 1981); see
also Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (holding that the rule
that overbreadth challenges cannot be brought against commercial speech regulations was
inapplicable when the issue was whether the manner in which an ordinance regulated solicitations
also intruded upon the rights of fully protected speech).
89
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Restrictions that target commercial speech but also inhibit
noncommercial speech are subject to an overbreadth analysis. 95 For
example, in Spannaus v. Century Camera, a Minnesota state law
provided that “[n]o employer or agent thereof shall directly or indirectly
solicit or require a polygraph.” 96 The Minnesota Supreme Court found
that while this law targeted commercial speech, the terms “solicit or
require” also had the potential to inhibit noncommercial speech, such as
an employer’s letter to the editor of the local newspaper on the subject of
polygraph testing. 97 Because of this potential danger, the court
recognized that Spannaus was not a commercial speech case and found
that the overbreadth doctrine was appropriate. 98
Likewise, Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) would
inhibit a substantial portion of fully protected, noncommercial speech.
Section 201.430(2) potentially prohibits news articles and Internet
postings on message boards, both of which are noncommercial in
nature. 99 The relevant portion of section 201.430(2) that affects
noncommercial speech states, “[i]t is unlawful for any person knowingly
to prepare or print an advertisement concerning a house of prostitution
not licensed for that purpose . . . .” 100 Section 201.430(3) then states
“[i]nclusion in any . . . publication of the address, location, or telephone
number of a house of prostitution, constitutes prima facie evidence of
advertising for purposes of this section.” 101 Therefore, according to the
statute, publications that include the location of an unlicensed brothel are
considered to be forms of unlawful advertising. 102
As a result, the construction of Nevada Revised Statutes section
201.430(2) has the potential to inhibit noncommercial speech, such as a
newspaper or magazine publication. For example, the statute would

95

State by Spannaus, 309 N.W.2d at 740-41.
Id. at 738 n.2 (citing MINN. STAT. § 181.75 (1980)).
97
Id. at 740-41.
98
Id. at 741.
99
See, e.g., Ad World, Inc. v. Twp. of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (3d Cir. 1982);
S.N.J. Newspapers, Inc. v. State of N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 542 F. Supp. 173, 182-83 (D.N.J. 1982)
(stating that the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of the press protect newspapers); see also
Hays Cnty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a free newspaper
that dealt with environmental and social justice issues was fully constitutionally protected speech
even though its publication expenses were covered in part by revenue derived from advertisers); Too
Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364, 373 (N.J. 2011) (stating that defendant was protected by
the First Amendment to post her thoughts online).
100
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011).
101
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(3) (Westlaw 2011).
102
Compare NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011), with NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 201.430(3) (Westlaw 2011).
96
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affect a newspaper article that covers an unlicensed brothel. If that
article mentioned the location or address of an unlicensed brothel, it
would constitute prima facie evidence of an advertisement pursuant to
Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(3). 103 Under Nevada Revised
Statutes section 201.430(2), it is unlawful for any person to print an
advertisement regarding unlicensed brothels. 104
The newspaper
publisher that printed an article that mentioned an unlicensed brothel
would therefore have to defend their free speech rights to avoid criminal
sanctions. Similar to Spannaus, 105 because the language of the section
201.430(2) poses a potential danger of reaching noncommercial speech,
the doctrine of overbreadth is applicable.
2.

The Doctrine of Overbreadth Applies to Statutes That Intertwine
Both Commercial and Noncommercial Speech

The doctrine of overbreadth applies to Nevada Revised Statutes
section 201.430(2) because this section intertwines both commercial and
noncommercial speech.
A law or ordinance may be facially
unconstitutional if it prohibits “such a broad range of protected conduct
that it is unconstitutionally ‘overbroad.’” 106 In general, a party has
standing to vindicate only his or her own constitutional rights. 107
However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception
to this general rule for laws that are written so broadly that they may
affect the protected speech of third parties. 108
If commercial speech is “inextricably intertwined” with
noncommercial speech, a court may not parse out the protected and
unprotected parts of the speech. 109 In S.O.C., Inc v. County of Clark, the
Ninth Circuit found that a county ordinance prohibiting off-premises
canvassing in public streets and sidewalks within the Las Vegas resort
district was overbroad because it restricted commercial speech that was
intertwined with noncommercial speech. 110 The ordinance did not

103

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(3) (Westlaw 2011).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011).
105
State by Spannaus v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 735 (Minn. 1981).
106
Members of the City Council of the City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
796 (1984).
107
S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir.1998); Members of City
Council of the City of L.A., 446 U.S. at 796.
108
S.O.C., Inc., 152 F.3d at 1142 (citing Members of City Council of the City of L.A., 446
U.S. at 798).
109
Id. at 1144 (citing Perry v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 121 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1997)).
110
Id.
104
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contain any limiting language such as “solely,” “exclusively,” or
“primarily” to ensure that only purely commercial speech was hindered
by the statute. 111 Absent these limitations in the statutory construction of
the ordinance, the Ninth Circuit found that there was a substantial
likelihood that the ordinance would inhibit the expression of fully
protected speech intertwined with commercial speech.112 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the term “off-premises canvassing” included fully
protected expression and would have prohibited the distribution of
newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and other publications that contain
Section 201.430(2) is
some form of commercial advertising. 113
unconstitutionally overbroad because the language of the statute
intertwines both commercial and noncommercial speech.
3.

Nevada Revised Statutes Section 201.430(2) Is Unconstitutionally
Overbroad

Section 201.430(2) is overbroad because it encompasses newspaper
articles and other fully protected types of speech. 114 Speech that is
noncommercial is generally entitled to full protection under the
Constitution. 115
Newspaper articles and reviews are usually not
considered advertising for commercial speech purposes because they
lack an economic incentive for engaging in the speech and do not
propose a commercial transaction. 116 Thus, such publications are
granted full protection under the First Amendment, and any restriction
that inhibits noncommercial speech is subject to strict scrutiny. 117 While
section 201.430(2) targets commercial speech, the restriction is

111

Id. at 1143-44.
Id. at 1144.
113
Id.
114
See generally id.
115
Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980)
(stating that the Constitution provides lesser protections to commercial speech than other forms of
expression); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (stating that the
most exacting scrutiny standard applies to regulations that suppress speech because of its content).
116
See, e.g., S.N.J. Newspapers, Inc. v. State of N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 542 F. Supp. 173, 18283 (D.N.J. 1982) (stating that the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of the press protect
newspapers); Ad World, Inc. v. Twp. of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (3d Cir. 1983); see
also Hays Cnty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a free
newspaper that dealt with environmental and social justice issues was fully constitutionally protected
speech even though its publication expenses were covered in part by revenue derived from
advertisers).
117
See Worrell Newspapers of Ind., Inc. v. Westhafer, 739 F.2d 1219, 1221-22 (7th Cir.
1984).
112
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constitutionally overbroad because the statute also restricts
noncommercial speech. 118
As discussed above, section 201.430(2) contains language that
inhibits certain types of noncommercial speech, such as newspaper
articles that cover the brothel industry. In Coyote Publishing, the Ninth
Circuit addressed a New York Times article used by the plaintiffs as an
example where section 201.430(3) would inhibit noncommercial
speech. 119 The article featured a picture of a legal brothel and revealed
the brothel’s web address and phone number. 120 The court determined
that section 201.430(3) did not burden any significant amount of fully
protected speech because section 201.430(1) prohibits only brothel
owners or persons acting on behalf of brothel owners from
advertising. 121 However, section 201.430(2), which regulates unlicensed
brothels, does inhibit fully protected speech because it does not apply
solely to brothel owners and those acting on behalf of brothels. 122 If the
New York Times article had instead featured an illegal brothel as
opposed to a legal brothel, the article would be considered an unlawful
advertisement under Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2)
because it publicizes the telephone number and identifies a way to obtain
directions to the brothel. 123
Additionally, section 201.430(2) uses language insufficient to
ensure that noncommercial speech, such as a newspaper publication, is
not intertwined with commercial speech. Just as the ordinances in
S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark did not ensure that only purely
commercial speech was restricted, section 201.430(2) contains no

118

The Constitution gives substantial protection from overbroad laws that chill First
Amendment speech. See United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that a statute
is unconstitutional on its face if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech); see also Hous.
Balloons & Promotions, LLC v. City of Hous., 589 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (holding
that the overbreadth doctrine is not applicable to a commercial speech case unless the challenged
regulation potentially inhibits noncommercial speech as well as commercial speech); King Enters.,
Inc. v. Thomas Twp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (stating that for noncommercial
speech, regulation is overbroad if it reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
speech).
119
Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 598 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 1556 (2011).
120
Steve Friess, Brothels Ask to Be Taxed, But Official Sees a Catch, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/us/26brothel.html.
121
Id.; see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(3) (Westlaw 2011). The relevant portion of the
statute that inhibits this article states, “Inclusion . . . of the . . . location or telephone number of a
house of prostitution . . . constitutes prima facie evidence of advertising for the purposes of this
section.”
122
See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011).
123
See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011).
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limiting language on its face. 124 Sections 201.430(2) and 201.430(3)
provide that it is unlawful to print an advertisement concerning an
unlicensed brothel and that inclusion in any publication of their address,
location, or telephone number constitutes prima facie evidence of
advertising. 125 These sections of the statute lack any phrases, such as
“solely or exclusively commercial transactions” as the court articulated
in S.O.C., Inc., to ensure that the application of this statute does no more
than restrict purely commercial transactions. 126 Absent these limitations
in the construction of Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2), the
statute will encompass noncommercial speech, such as newspapers,
pamphlets, magazines, Internet blogs, and other mediums of expression.
Although statutes that regulate purely commercial speech are generally
not subject to an overbreadth analysis, Nevada Revised Statutes section
201.430(2) also encompasses noncommercial speech. 127 Therefore, an
overbreadth analysis should be applied to section 201.430(2) and the
statute should be deemed unconstitutionally overbroad.
B.

STRICT SCRUTINY SHOULD BE USED TO ANALYZE NEVADA
REVISED STATUTES SECTION 201.430(2)

Section 201.430(2) inhibits more than just purely commercial
speech and requires a strict scrutiny analysis as opposed to the Central
Hudson standard. While the Ninth Circuit in Coyote Publishing
refrained from analyzing section 201.430(2) since it did not apply to the
facts of the case, the court determined that section 201.430(1) was
subject to a modified intermediate level of scrutiny because the statute
regulated only commercial speech. 128 Section 201.430(2) on the other
hand restricts fully protected First Amendment speech, such as
newspaper articles and Internet blogs, thus requiring a strict scrutiny
analysis.
The Ninth Circuit in Coyote Publishing noted that section
201.430(1) prohibits only brothel owners, or persons “acting on behalf
of” brothel owners, from advertising. 129 As a result, the Ninth Circuit

124

S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 201.430 (Westlaw 2011).
125
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2)-(3) (Westlaw 2011).
126
S.O.C., Inc., 152 F.3d at 1143-44.
127
See generally Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
496-97 (1982); United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1309 (D. Utah 2003).
128
Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 599 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1556 (2011).
129
Id.
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held that a publisher of a news account would not be held liable under
section 201.430(1). 130 While section 201.430(1) prohibits people acting
on behalf of a brothel to advertise in public places, 131 section 201.430(2)
does not mention the words “acting on behalf of” a brothel owner
because the statute regulates unlicensed brothels. 132 Instead, section
201.430(2) inhibits any publisher, not just those acting on behalf of a
brothel, from publishing articles about unlicensed brothels. 133 Based on
the construction of this statute, newspapers and other publishers could be
subject to criminal sanctions even though they were not acting on behalf
of a legal brothel. The statute inhibits fully protected speech such as
newspapers, Internet blogs and other mediums of news sources, and thus
requires a strict scrutiny analysis.
1.

Nevada Revised Statutes Section 201.430(2) Should be Subject to
Strict Scrutiny Analysis

Section 201.430(2) inhibits noncommercial speech and should be
analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard. Speech is “commercial” if it
does no more than propose a commercial transaction. 134 When a law
interferes with a fundamental right, such as free speech, the court must
review the legislation with strict scrutiny. 135 Advertising regulations
targeting commercial speech, but also interfering with fully protected
types of speech, do not meet the “no more than” standard and should not
be analyzed using the Central Hudson standard. 136
As discussed above, section 201.430(2) restricts noncommercial
speech found in newspaper articles and Internet blogs. Such publications
are not considered advertising for commercial speech purposes and are
granted full First Amendment protections. 137 Since section 201.430(2)

130

Id.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(1) (Westlaw 2011).
132
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(1), (2) (Westlaw 2011).
133
Compare NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(1) (Westlaw 2011), with NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 201.430(3) (Westlaw 2011).
134
See generally Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1017 (9th Cir.
2004); Complete Angler, LLC v. City of Clearwater, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 2009);
Volkswagen AG v. Dorling Kindersley Publ’g, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 793, 809-10 (E.D. Mich. 2009);
Hous. Balloons & Promotions, LLC v. City of Hous., 589 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
135
See Miller v. Murphy, 191 Cal. Rptr. 740, 743–44 (Ct. App. 1983); Harrold v. Collier, 836
N.E.2d 1165, 1171 (Ohio 2005).
136
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002).
137
See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 (1988) (stating that
the economic motivation of a newspaper to sell copies does not render the article’s commercial
speech deserving of less stringent constitutional protection).
131
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regulates types of noncommercial speech, it does not meet the “no more
than” criteria accepted by the Ninth Circuit. 138 Consequently, Nevada
Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) is subject to a strict scrutiny analysis
as opposed to the Central Hudson test.
2.

Nevada Revised Statutes Section 201.430(2) Would Fail a Strict
Scrutiny Analysis

Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) would be invalid under
a strict scrutiny analysis because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest. It is substantially more difficult for a statute to
be constitutionally valid when analyzed under strict scrutiny—the most
exacting standard—than when analyzed under the Central Hudson
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the government must
test. 139
demonstrate that the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve the
compelling state interest in limiting the commodification of sex.140
The government has the burden of proving that there is a
compelling state interest, not just a substantial interest, to justify Nevada
Revised Statutes section 201.430(2). 141 To conclude that a compelling
interest exists, a court must find a relatively high degree of government
concern to justify the particular invasion of the constitutional right. 142
Examples of compelling government interests include protecting the
physical well being of minors and protecting national security.143 The
universe of interests a court can consider compelling to justify
restrictions on free speech is extraordinarily limited. 144 Here, there are
compelling interests to justify Nevada Revised Statutes section
201.430(2), including the protection of children from being exposed to
advertisements for unlicensed brothels. Decreasing prostitution is also a
compelling governmental interest. 145 However, even if the government
could demonstrate a compelling state interest, section 201.430(2) would
138

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762

(1976).
139

Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, LLC v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., No.
09CA1230, 2010 WL 1492308 (Colo. App. Apr. 15, 2010), cert. granted, 2010 WL 4159242 (Colo.
Oct. 18, 2010).
140
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
141
Id.
142
Robinson v. City of Seattle, 10 P.3d 452, 467 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
143
See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
144
See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns, 492 U.S. at 126.
145
See, e.g., Frieling v. State, 67 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Tex. App. 2002); State v. Mueller, 671
P.2d 1351, 1354 (Haw. 1983), State v. Davis, 623 So.2d 622, 624 (Fla. App. 1993).
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nevertheless fail a strict scrutiny analysis because it is not narrowly
tailored.
Section 201.430(2) is not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
state interest because it restricts noncommercial speech protected by the
First Amendment. If the law encompasses too much or too little to
advance this compelling interest, it will fail the “narrowly tailored”
requirement. 146 A regulation that infringes upon First Amendment rights
will be sustained only if the regulation is narrowly tailored and if it does
not excessively intrude upon the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms. 147 In Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now v. City of Frontenac, a nonprofit organization brought suit claiming
the city of Frontenac’s ordinance that restricted door-to-door solicitation
was unconstitutional. 148 The city of Frontenac argued that the ordinance
was necessary to protect the security and privacy of Frontenac
residents. 149 The court held that although the city’s objectives to reduce
crime were legitimate, the regulation was not sufficiently tailored to
avoid conflict with the nonprofit organization’s First Amendment
freedoms. 150 The court noted that the government failed to demonstrate
that its objectives would not be served by less restrictive alternatives. 151
Similar to Frontenac, Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2)
is not narrowly tailored because the government’s objectives should be
reached by means that do not restrict noncommercial speech. Although
there are compelling interests, such as eliminating illegal brothels and
prostitution, section 201.430(2) encompasses too much speech because it
also prohibits periodicals and articles that feature noncommercial speech
protected by the First Amendment. As a result, Nevada Revised Statutes
section 201.430(2) would fail a strict scrutiny analysis because it is not
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
CONCLUSION
In Coyote Publishing, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a situation
where newspaper publishers challenged the validity of statutes that
regulated advertising of legal brothels. 152 The court consequently held
146
147

Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 201 (6th Cir. 2010).
Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 817 (8th Cir.

1983).
148

Id. at 815-16.
Id. at 816.
150
Id. at 818.
151
Id.
152
Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1556
149
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that Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(1), which restricts
advertising of licensed brothels, was constitutional. 153 However, had the
facts of the case pertained to publications of unlicensed brothels instead
of licensed brothels, section 201.430(2) would have applied. Nevada
Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) is an unconstitutional restriction on
free speech because it regulates commercial as well as noncommercial
speech. As a result, section 201.430(2) is overbroad and is subject to a
strict scrutiny analysis as opposed to the more lenient Central Hudson
test. Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) would consequently
fail a strict scrutiny analysis and is therefore unconstitutional.

2011).
153

Id. at 611.
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